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Advanced microeconomic theory / Geoffrey A. Jehle y Philip J. Reny

By: Jehle, Geoffrey Alexander [autor].
Contributor(s): Reny, Philip J [autor].
Publisher: Boston : Prentice - Hall, ©2011Edition: Third Edition.Description: xvi, 656 páginas : ilustraciones, gráficos, tablas ; 25 cm.Content type: Media type: Carrier type: ISBN: 9780273731917.Subject(s): Economía matemática | Microeconomía | Microeconomía | Teoria de los juegos | Teoria economicaDDC classification: 338.5 J388
Contents:
Consumer theory. - - Topics in consumer theory. - - Theory of the firm. - - Partial equilibrium. - - General equilibrium. - - Social choice and welfare. - - Game theory. - - Information economics. - - Auctions and mechanism design. - - Sets and mappings. - - Calculus and optimisations.
Summary: Advanced microeconomic theory remains a rigorous, up-to-date standard in microeconomics, giving all the mathematics and moderm theory the advanced student must master. Long known for careful development theory, together with clear, patient explanation, this student-friendly text, with its efficient theorem-proof organization, and many examples and exercises, is uniquely effective in advanced courses.
List(s) this item appears in: Economía
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Item type Current location Collection Call number Vol info Copy number Status Date due Barcode Item holds
Book Book B. Campus los Cerros
Colección general
Colección general 338.5 J388 (Browse shelf) 3a ed. 2011 1 Available 0000047525
Book Book B. Campus los Cerros
Colección general
Colección general 338.5 J388 (Browse shelf) 3a ed. 2011 2 Available 0000047526
Total holds: 0

Enhanced descriptions from Syndetics:

'Advanced Microeconomic Theory' remains a rigorous, up-to-date standard in microeconomics, giving all the core mathematics and modern theory the advanced student must master. This student-friendly text, with its efficient theorem-proof organization, and many examples and exercises, is uniquely effective in advanced courses.

include index and reference biography

Consumer theory. - - Topics in consumer theory. - - Theory of the firm. - - Partial equilibrium. - - General equilibrium. - - Social choice and welfare. - - Game theory. - - Information economics. - - Auctions and mechanism design. - - Sets and mappings. - - Calculus and optimisations.

Advanced microeconomic theory remains a rigorous, up-to-date standard in microeconomics, giving all the mathematics and moderm theory the advanced student must master. Long known for careful development theory, together with clear, patient explanation, this student-friendly text, with its efficient theorem-proof organization, and many examples and exercises, is uniquely effective in advanced courses.

Table of contents provided by Syndetics

  • Preface
  • Part 1 Economic Agents
  • Chapter 1 Consumer Theory
  • 1.1 Primitive Notions
  • 1.2 Preferences and Utility
  • 1.2.1 Preference Relations
  • 1.2.2 The Utility Function
  • 1.3 The Consumer's Problem
  • 1.4 Indirect Utility and Expenditure
  • 1.4.1 The Indirect Utility Function
  • 1.4.2 The Expenditure Function
  • 1.4.3 Relations Between the Two
  • 1.5 Properties of Consumer Demand
  • 1.5.1 Relative Prices and Real Income
  • 1.5.2 Income and Substitution Effects
  • 1.5.3 Some Elasticity Relations
  • 1.6 Exercises
  • Chapter 2 Topics In Consumer Theory
  • 2.1 Duality: A Closer Look
  • 2.1.1 Expenditure and Consumer Preferences
  • 2.1.2 Convexity and Monotonicity
  • 2.1.3 Indirect Utility and Consumer Preferences
  • 2.2 Integrability
  • 2.3 Revealed Preference
  • 2.4 Uncertainty
  • 2.4.1 Preferences
  • 2.4.2 Von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility
  • 2.4.3 Risk Aversion
  • 2.5 Exercises
  • Chapter 3 Theory of the Firm
  • 3.1 Primitive Notions
  • 3.2 Production
  • 3.2.1 Returns to Scale and Varying Proportions
  • 3.3 Cost
  • 3.4 Duality in Production
  • 3.5 The Competitive Firm
  • 3.5.1 Profit Maximisation
  • 3.5.2 The Profit Function
  • 3.6 Exercises
  • Part 2 Markets and Welfare
  • Chapter 4 Partial Equalibrium
  • 4.1 Perfect Competition
  • 4.2 Imperfect Competition
  • 4.2.1 Cournot Oligopoly
  • 4.2.2 Bertrand Oligopoly
  • 4.2.3 Monopolistic Competition
  • 4.3 Equilibrium and Welfare
  • 4.3.1 Price and Individual Welfare
  • 4.3.2 Efficiency of the Competitive Outcome
  • 4.3.3 Efficiency and Total Surplus Maximisation
  • 4.4 Exercises
  • Chapter 5 General Equalibrium
  • 5.1 Equilibrium in Exchange
  • 5.2 Equilibrium in Competitive Market Systems
  • 5.2.1 Existence of Equilibrium
  • 5.2.2 Efficiency
  • 5.3 Equilibrium in Production
  • 5.3.1 Producers
  • 5.3.2 Consumers
  • 5.3.3 Equilibrium
  • 5.3.4 Welfare
  • 5.4 Contingent Plans
  • 5.4.1 Time
  • 5.4.2 Uncertainty
  • 5.4.3 Walrasian Equilibrium with Contingent Commodities
  • 5.5 Core and Equilibria
  • 5.5.1 Replica Economies
  • 5.6 Exercises
  • Chapter 6 Social Choice and Welfare
  • 6.1 The Nature of the Problem
  • 6.2 Social Choice and Arrow's Theorem
  • 6.2.1 A Diagrammatic Proof
  • 6.3 Measurability, Comparability, and Some Possibilities
  • 6.3.1 The Rawlsian Form
  • 6.3.2 The Utilitarian Form
  • 6.3.3 Flexible Forms
  • 6.4 Justice
  • 6.5 Social Choice and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
  • 6.6 Exercises
  • Part 3 Strategic Behaviour
  • Chapter 7 Game Theory
  • 7.1 Strategic Decision Making
  • 7.2 Strategic Form Games
  • 7.2.1 Dominant Strategies
  • 7.2.2 Nash Equilibrium
  • 7.2.3 Incomplete Information
  • 7.3 Extensive Form Games
  • 7.3.1 Game Trees: A Diagrammatic Representation
  • 7.3.2 An Informal Analysis of Take-Away
  • 7.3.3 Extensive Form Game Strategies
  • 7.3.4 Strategies and Payoffs
  • 7.3.5 Games of Perfect Information and Backward Induction Strategies
  • 7.3.6 Games of Imperfect Information and Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
  • 7.3.7 Sequential Equilibrium
  • 7.4 Exercises
  • Chapter 8 Information Economics
  • 8.1 Adverse Selection
  • 8.1.1 Information and the Efficiency of Market Outcomes
  • 8.1.2 Signalling
  • 8.1.3 Screening
  • 8.2 Moral Hazard and the Principal-Agent Problem
  • 8.2.1 Symmetric Information
  • 8.2.2 Asymmetric Information
  • 8.3 Information and Market Performance
  • 8.4 Exercises
  • Chapter 9 Auctions and Mechanism Design
  • 9.1 The Four Standard Auctions
  • 9.2 The Independent Private Values Model
  • 9.2.1 Bidding Behaviour in a First-Price, Sealed-Bid Auction
  • 9.2.2 Bidding Behaviour in a Dutch Auction
  • 9.2.3 Bidding Behaviour in a Second-Price, Sealed-Bid Auction
  • 9.2.4 Bidding Behaviour in an English Auction
  • 9.2.5 Revenue Comparisons
  • 9.3 The Revenue Equivalence Theorem
  • 9.3.1 Incentive-Compatible Direct Selling Mechanisms: A Characterisation
  • 9.3.2 Efficiency
  • 9.4 Designing a Revenue Maximising Mechanism
  • 9.4.1 The Revelation Principle
  • 9.4.2 Individual Rationality
  • 9.4.3 An Optimal Selling Mechanism
  • 9.4.4 A Closer Look at the Optimal Selling Mechanism
  • 9.4.5 Efficiency, Symmetry, and Comparison to the Four Standard Auctions
  • 9.5 Designing Allocatively Efficient Mechanisms
  • 9.5.1 Quasi-Linear Utility and Private Values
  • 9.5.2 Ex Post Pareto Efficiency
  • 9.5.3 Direct Mechanisms, Incentive Comparability and the Revelation Principle
  • 9.5.4 The Vickery-Clarke-Groves Mechanism
  • 9.5.5 Achieving a Balanced Budget: Expected Externality Mechanisms
  • 9.5.6 Property Rights, Outside Options, and Individual Rationality Contraints
  • 9.5.7 The IR-VCG Mechanism: Sufficiency of Expected Surplus
  • 9.6 Exercises
  • Mathematical Appendices
  • Chapter A1 Sets and Mappings
  • A1.1 Elements of Logic
  • A1.1.1 Necessity and Sufficiency
  • A1.1.2 Theorems and Proofs
  • A1.2 Elements of Set Theory
  • A1.2.1 Notation and Basic Concepts
  • A1.2.2 Convex Sets
  • A1.2.3 Relations and Functions
  • A1.3 A Little Topology
  • A1.3.1 Continuity
  • A1.3.2 Some Existence Theorems
  • A1.4 Real-Valued Functions
  • A1.4.1 Related Sets
  • A1.4.2 Concave Functions
  • A1.4.3 Quasiconcave Functions
  • A1.4.4 Convex and Quasiconvex Functions
  • A1.5 Exercises
  • Chapter A2 Calculus and Optimisation
  • A2.1 Calculus
  • A2.1.1 Functions of a Single Variable
  • A2.1.2 Functions of Several Variables
  • A2.1.3 Homogeneous Functions
  • A2.2 Optimisation
  • A2.2.1 Real-Valued Functions of Several Variables
  • A2.2.2 Second-Order Conditions
  • A2.3 Constrained Optimisation
  • A2.3.1 Equality Constraints
  • A2.3.2 Lagrange's Method
  • A2.3.3 Geometric Interpretation
  • A2.3.4 Second-Order Conditions
  • A2.3.5 Inequality Constraints
  • A2.3.6 Kuhn-Tucker Conditions
  • A2.4 Optimality Theorems
  • A2.5 Separation Theorems
  • A2.6 Exercises
  • List of Theorems
  • List of Definitions
  • Hints and Answers
  • References
  • Index

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