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Advanced microeconomic theory Geoffrey A. Jehle y Philip J. Reny

By: Jehle, Geoffrey Alexander.
Contributor(s): Reny, Philip J.
Publisher: Boston Prentice Hall 2011Edition: Third Edition.Description: xvi, 656 p. il., figras., gráfs., tabls. 25 cm.ISBN: 9780273731917.Subject(s): Teoria de los juegos | Teoria economica | MicroeconomíaDDC classification: 338.5 J388
List(s) this item appears in: Economía
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Item type Current location Collection Call number Vol info Copy number Status Date due Item holds
Libro-General Libro-General B. Campus los Cerros
Colección general
Colección general 338.5 J388 3a ed. 2011 1 Available
Libro-General Libro-General B. Campus los Cerros
Colección general
Colección general 338.5 J388 3a ed. 2011 2 Available
Total holds: 0

Enhanced descriptions from Syndetics:

Your classic advanced microeconomic theory textbook delivering rigorous coverage of modern microeconomics.

include index and reference biography

Table of contents provided by Syndetics

  • Preface
  • Part 1 Economic Agents
  • Chapter 1 Consumer Theory
  • 1.1 Primitive Notions
  • 1.2 Preferences and Utility
  • 1.2.1 Preference Relations
  • 1.2.2 The Utility Function
  • 1.3 The Consumer's Problem
  • 1.4 Indirect Utility and Expenditure
  • 1.4.1 The Indirect Utility Function
  • 1.4.2 The Expenditure Function
  • 1.4.3 Relations Between the Two
  • 1.5 Properties of Consumer Demand
  • 1.5.1 Relative Prices and Real Income
  • 1.5.2 Income and Substitution Effects
  • 1.5.3 Some Elasticity Relations
  • 1.6 Exercises
  • Chapter 2 Topics In Consumer Theory
  • 2.1 Duality: A Closer Look
  • 2.1.1 Expenditure and Consumer Preferences
  • 2.1.2 Convexity and Monotonicity
  • 2.1.3 Indirect Utility and Consumer Preferences
  • 2.2 Integrability
  • 2.3 Revealed Preference
  • 2.4 Uncertainty
  • 2.4.1 Preferences
  • 2.4.2 Von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility
  • 2.4.3 Risk Aversion
  • 2.5 Exercises
  • Chapter 3 Theory of the Firm
  • 3.1 Primitive Notions
  • 3.2 Production
  • 3.2.1 Returns to Scale and Varying Proportions
  • 3.3 Cost
  • 3.4 Duality in Production
  • 3.5 The Competitive Firm
  • 3.5.1 Profit Maximisation
  • 3.5.2 The Profit Function
  • 3.6 Exercises
  • Part 2 Markets and Welfare
  • Chapter 4 Partial Equalibrium
  • 4.1 Perfect Competition
  • 4.2 Imperfect Competition
  • 4.2.1 Cournot Oligopoly
  • 4.2.2 Bertrand Oligopoly
  • 4.2.3 Monopolistic Competition
  • 4.3 Equilibrium and Welfare
  • 4.3.1 Price and Individual Welfare
  • 4.3.2 Efficiency of the Competitive Outcome
  • 4.3.3 Efficiency and Total Surplus Maximisation
  • 4.4 Exercises
  • Chapter 5 General Equalibrium
  • 5.1 Equilibrium in Exchange
  • 5.2 Equilibrium in Competitive Market Systems
  • 5.2.1 Existence of Equilibrium
  • 5.2.2 Efficiency
  • 5.3 Equilibrium in Production
  • 5.3.1 Producers
  • 5.3.2 Consumers
  • 5.3.3 Equilibrium
  • 5.3.4 Welfare
  • 5.4 Contingent Plans
  • 5.4.1 Time
  • 5.4.2 Uncertainty
  • 5.4.3 Walrasian Equilibrium with Contingent Commodities
  • 5.5 Core and Equilibria
  • 5.5.1 Replica Economies
  • 5.6 Exercises
  • Chapter 6 Social Choice and Welfare
  • 6.1 The Nature of the Problem
  • 6.2 Social Choice and Arrow's Theorem
  • 6.2.1 A Diagrammatic Proof
  • 6.3 Measurability, Comparability, and Some Possibilities
  • 6.3.1 The Rawlsian Form
  • 6.3.2 The Utilitarian Form
  • 6.3.3 Flexible Forms
  • 6.4 Justice
  • 6.5 Social Choice and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
  • 6.6 Exercises
  • Part 3 Strategic Behaviour
  • Chapter 7 Game Theory
  • 7.1 Strategic Decision Making
  • 7.2 Strategic Form Games
  • 7.2.1 Dominant Strategies
  • 7.2.2 Nash Equilibrium
  • 7.2.3 Incomplete Information
  • 7.3 Extensive Form Games
  • 7.3.1 Game Trees: A Diagrammatic Representation
  • 7.3.2 An Informal Analysis of Take-Away
  • 7.3.3 Extensive Form Game Strategies
  • 7.3.4 Strategies and Payoffs
  • 7.3.5 Games of Perfect Information and Backward Induction Strategies
  • 7.3.6 Games of Imperfect Information and Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
  • 7.3.7 Sequential Equilibrium
  • 7.4 Exercises
  • Chapter 8 Information Economics
  • 8.1 Adverse Selection
  • 8.1.1 Information and the Efficiency of Market Outcomes
  • 8.1.2 Signalling
  • 8.1.3 Screening
  • 8.2 Moral Hazard and the Principal-Agent Problem
  • 8.2.1 Symmetric Information
  • 8.2.2 Asymmetric Information
  • 8.3 Information and Market Performance
  • 8.4 Exercises
  • Chapter 9 Auctions and Mechanism Design
  • 9.1 The Four Standard Auctions
  • 9.2 The Independent Private Values Model
  • 9.2.1 Bidding Behaviour in a First-Price, Sealed-Bid Auction
  • 9.2.2 Bidding Behaviour in a Dutch Auction
  • 9.2.3 Bidding Behaviour in a Second-Price, Sealed-Bid Auction
  • 9.2.4 Bidding Behaviour in an English Auction
  • 9.2.5 Revenue Comparisons
  • 9.3 The Revenue Equivalence Theorem
  • 9.3.1 Incentive-Compatible Direct Selling Mechanisms: A Characterisation
  • 9.3.2 Efficiency
  • 9.4 Designing a Revenue Maximising Mechanism
  • 9.4.1 The Revelation Principle
  • 9.4.2 Individual Rationality
  • 9.4.3 An Optimal Selling Mechanism
  • 9.4.4 A Closer Look at the Optimal Selling Mechanism
  • 9.4.5 Efficiency, Symmetry, and Comparison to the Four Standard Auctions
  • 9.5 Designing Allocatively Efficient Mechanisms
  • 9.5.1 Quasi-Linear Utility and Private Values
  • 9.5.2 Ex Post Pareto Efficiency
  • 9.5.3 Direct Mechanisms, Incentive Comparability and the Revelation Principle
  • 9.5.4 The Vickery-Clarke-Groves Mechanism
  • 9.5.5 Achieving a Balanced Budget: Expected Externality Mechanisms
  • 9.5.6 Property Rights, Outside Options, and Individual Rationality Contraints
  • 9.5.7 The IR-VCG Mechanism: Sufficiency of Expected Surplus
  • 9.6 Exercises
  • Mathematical Appendices
  • Chapter A1 Sets and Mappings
  • A1.1 Elements of Logic
  • A1.1.1 Necessity and Sufficiency
  • A1.1.2 Theorems and Proofs
  • A1.2 Elements of Set Theory
  • A1.2.1 Notation and Basic Concepts
  • A1.2.2 Convex Sets
  • A1.2.3 Relations and Functions
  • A1.3 A Little Topology
  • A1.3.1 Continuity
  • A1.3.2 Some Existence Theorems
  • A1.4 Real-Valued Functions
  • A1.4.1 Related Sets
  • A1.4.2 Concave Functions
  • A1.4.3 Quasiconcave Functions
  • A1.4.4 Convex and Quasiconvex Functions
  • A1.5 Exercises
  • Chapter A2 Calculus and Optimisation
  • A2.1 Calculus
  • A2.1.1 Functions of a Single Variable
  • A2.1.2 Functions of Several Variables
  • A2.1.3 Homogeneous Functions
  • A2.2 Optimisation
  • A2.2.1 Real-Valued Functions of Several Variables
  • A2.2.2 Second-Order Conditions
  • A2.3 Constrained Optimisation
  • A2.3.1 Equality Constraints
  • A2.3.2 Lagrange's Method
  • A2.3.3 Geometric Interpretation
  • A2.3.4 Second-Order Conditions
  • A2.3.5 Inequality Constraints
  • A2.3.6 Kuhn-Tucker Conditions
  • A2.4 Optimality Theorems
  • A2.5 Separation Theorems
  • A2.6 Exercises
  • List of Theorems
  • List of Definitions
  • Hints and Answers
  • References
  • Index

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